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COMMENTS ON THE SECOND REPORT OF THE MARYLAND
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RESEARCH WORKING
GROUP
FRANKLIN

I.

G.

MILLER PH.D.*

INTRODUCTION

The Maryland Attorney General's Research Working Group (Research Working Group), in its Second Report recommending legislation for regulating research with decisionally incapacitated
individuals, has produced a path-breaking document.' It makes a major contribution to the debate over a complex, difficult, and controversial topic. My comments on the recommended legislation draw on
my experience over the past six years as a member of the institutional
review board (IRB) for the intramural research program of the National Institute of Mental Health. The IRB reviews and approves research that involves patients with Alzheimer's disease and severe
psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia.
II.

SCOPE OF WORKING GROUP's PROPOSED LEGISLATION

CONCERNING DECISIONALLY INCAPACITATED SUBJECTS

The Legislative Findings of the proposed legislation state that
"[r]esearch involving decisionally incapacitated individuals may be essential under some circumstances if science is to understand and ultimately combat diseases of the brain, including Alzheimer's Disease,
severe psychiatric disorders, severe trauma, stroke, and other causes of
decisional incapacity."' This suggests that the recommended legislation be intended to encompass research involving patients with a
broad range of conditions, including "severe psychiatric disorders"
such as schizophrenia. Overall opinion would concur that patients
* Associate Professor of Medical Education at the University of Virginia. Dr. Miller is
also a senior research fellow at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and serves on ethics committees at the NIH Clinical Center and the Jewish Social Services Agency's Hospice and
Home Care Program. He has authored and co-authored several articles on the ethical and
policy dimensions on the issue of physician-assisted death. The author would like to acknowledge and express his indebtedness to Donald L. Rosenstein, M.D., for his helpful
comments.
1.Jack Schwartz, Office of the Md. Att'y Gen., Second Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group (May 1997) [hereinafter Second Report] (the Second Report is reprinted in the appendix to this issue of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
2. Second Report, supra note 1,at A-4 (§ 20-501 (c) of the draft legislation; reprinted
in Appendix A to the Second Report).
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with the dementing condition of Alzheimer's disease lose decisionmaking capacity as the disease progresses. Considerable controversy,
however, surrounds the question of whether patients with severe psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia and profound depression,
are decisionally incapacitated with respect to research participation.3
For the past 20 years, many caretakers and researchers working with
the mentally ill have claimed that mentally ill persons are capable of
informed consent.4 Therefore, some psychiatric investigators 5 have
resisted more stringent requirements for mentally ill research
subjects. 6
We should not presume that, as a class, patients with schizophrenia or severe depression lack decisional capacity. Nor should we presume that such patients are just as capable of giving informed consent
for participation in research as normal volunteers or patients with
non-psychiatric medical disorders. The meager data from empirical
studies, although subject to conflicting interpretations, raise concerns
about the decision-making capacity of severely ill patients with schizophrenia.7 In general, diagnostic categories do not reliably indicate
whether or not individual patients are incapable of giving informed
consent to participate in research.' Rather, it is necessary to assess the
patients' ability to understand the nature of a specific study, what participation involves, the risks and potential benefits to participation,
and the alternatives to research participation. Along with these con-

3. See Barbara H. Stanley & Michael Stanley, Psychiatric Patients in Research: Protecting
their Autonomy, 22 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 420, 420-21 (1981).
4. See id. at 421.
5. The draft legislation defines "investigator" as a person who conducts research by

means of: (1) physical procedures by which data are gathered from a living individual; (2)
manipulation of an individual or the individual's environment; (3) communication or interpersonal contact between an investigator and individual; or (4) gathering individually
identifiable private information, including information about behavior that occurs in a
context in which an individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is
taking place and information which has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the individual can reasonably expect will not be made public. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-3 (§ 20-501 (1)(1)-(4) of the draft legislation).
6. A number of mental health professionals feel a protective stand is unwarranted. See
Stanley & Stanley, supra note 3, at 421.
7. See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Applebaum, Comparisons of Standardsfor Assessing Patients Capacitiesto Make Treatment Decisions, 152 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 1033, 1035 (1995); see also
Paul S. Applebaum, Rethinking the Conduct of Psychiatric Research, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PYCHiATRY 117, 118 (1997); William T. Carpenter, Jr. et al., The Rationale and Ethics of MedicationFree Research in Schizophrenia,54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 401, 405 (1997);JosephJ. Fins &
Franklin G. Miller, The Call of the Sirens: Navigating the Ethics of Medication-FreeResearch in
Schizophrenia, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PsycHiATRY'415, 415-416 (1997).

8. See Carpenter, Jr. et al., supra note 7, at 405.
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siderations, researchers must assess the patients' ability to voluntarily
agree to enroll in the study.
III.

COMMENTS ON DRAFr LEGISLATION

A.

Terminology

There are some minor points to discuss to clarify the definition of
terms. First, the term "monitor" in the proposed legislation seems inappropriate.9 A monitor is someone who is designated to carry out an
activity to make sure the rules are being followed.' ° However, the role
of the monitor in this law includes giving consent when neither a research agent, health care agent, nor surrogate are available to speak
for the potential research patient who lacks decisional capacity."1 Giving legally valid consent is a function that, strictly speaking, lies
outside the scope of monitoring. Moreover, the term connotes a policing role, and thus may provoke resistance on the part of investigators. It would be desirable, therefore, to formulate a more fitting
term for this role. Likewise, the definition of "monitor" should give
some indication of the functions included in this important role.
The definition of "surrogate" refers the reader to another part of
the law, not included in the Second Report.' Ifthe Final Report is
intended as a document to be used by investigators and IRBs, then all
the important terms should be defined and provided. This is especially significant for "surrogate" since it is possible that this term might
be confused with "health care agent."'" B.

Research Involving More than Minimal Risk

The two sections in the draft legislation concerning what counts
as research posing more than minimal risk merit critical scrutiny. For
example, section 20-504(d) (3) states that:
An IRB may not determine that research presents a minimal
risk if the research would expose the class of subjects who are
9. See Second Report, supra note 1, at A-4 (§ 20-502(o) of the draft legislation).
10. See id
I]. See id
12. See id. at A-5. Pursuant to the Annotated Code of Maryland, "surrogate" means an

adult authorized to make health care decisions for an individual. MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-605 (1994).
13. Surrogates are more limited than are health care agents in their ability to consent
for decisionally impaired individuals. The proposed legislation defines a "health care
agent" as appointed by an individual under an advance directive and authorized under the
Health Care Decisions Act to make health care decisions for the individual. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-2 (§ 20-502(f) of the draft legislation).
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intended to be enrolled in the research to a loss of dignity
greater than ordinarily experienced by individuals who are
not decisionally incapacitated during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. 4
In principle, it seems appropriate to include consequences to a person's dignity within the scope of risk assessment for research. However, it is far from clear what is meant by "loss of dignity." Clarifying
this phrase by providing examples would aid IRBs in determining
what type of research crosses the "minimal risk" threshold.
The draft legislation further stipulates in section 20-504(d)(4)
that:
An IRB may not certify research as presenting a minimal risk
or a minor increase over minimal risk if the research would
expose the class of subjects who are intended to be enrolled
in the research to the reasonable possibility of: (i) severe or
prolonged pain or discomfort; or (ii) deterioration in a medical condition.' 5
Interpretation of this provision presents some potentially serious

problems. What does "reasonable possibility" mean? What makes a
possibility reasonable, as opposed to unreasonable? Is a certain minimal probability of serious harm what is contemplated by "reasonable
possibility"? If a minimum probability of serious harm is the proper
meaning then this should be made explicit.
Problems of interpreting what constitutes a "minimal risk" or a
"minor increase over minimal risk" within the terms of the proposed
legislation can be illustrated by focusing on two common types of
studies in psychiatric research: challenge studies and studies using
positron emission tomography (PET) scans. Challenge studies involve
administering drugs or procedures likely to provoke characteristic
symptoms of psychiatric disorders for the purpose of investigating the
pathophysiology of these disorders under controlled conditions."6
These studies are not therapeutic and present no prospects of direct
medical benefit to the patients who participate in them. 7 The symptoms provoked are usually relatively mild and not prolonged.' 8 How-

14. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-7.
15. See id.
16. Franklin G. Miller & Donald L. Rosenstein, Psychiatric Symptom-Provoking Studies: An
Ethical Appraisal 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 403, 403 (1997).

17. See id. at 404.
18. See id. at 405-06.
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ever, in published reports of challenge studies,' 9 provoked symptoms
for some patients have been more severe and long lasting.2"
Challenge studies with decisionally incapacitated patients may
qualify as more than a minor increase over minimal risk, even if the
symptoms they produce are not severe or long-lasting. A typical paradigm for schizophrenia research is to administer a psychostimulant,
such as methylphenidate, which provokes psychotic symptoms in
schizophrenic patients. The symptoms of distorted thought and
mood provoked in this type of research may, or may not, be considered "severe" or as causing prolonged discomfort. In any case, they
are likely to be familiar to the patients, since they are characteristic of
their disorder. Despite differences of opinion concerning the seriousness of the symptom provocation," it is arguable that to produce by
means of research interventions the symptoms of a disease in patients
who suffer from that disease would be to cause a "deterioration in a
medical condition." The patient is made worse, even if only for a
short time.
If the interpretation of challenge studies as presenting more than
a minor increase over minimal risk is correct, then, according to the
draft legislation, such studies with decisionally incapacitated patients
could only be conducted under the very restrictive conditions of § 20510 which addresses "no expected benefit research. 22 These conditions require that the patient, while capacitated, prepare an advance
directive authorizing participation in the very sort of research protocol under consideration-to be confirmed by a monitor. In addition,
the research agent" who understands the goals and risks of the research also to be confirmed by the monitor-determines that the patient would consent to participate in this study if capable of giving
informed consent.2 4 Whether this constitutes a desirable or undesirable limitation of potentially promising research needs to be carefully
considered. Challenge studies in psychiatric research with decisionally incapacitated patients are morally problematic butjustifiable, provided that the challenge studies have scientific merit and adequate
safeguards in place. If the law makes challenge studies by their very
19. See id.
20. See id.
at 406.
21. See id. at 405-06.
22. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-14.
23. "Research agent" is defined in § 20-502(r) of the draft legislation as "an adult who,
under an advance directive authorizing research participation, is expressly authorized to
make decisions regarding an individual's participation in research, whether or not the
research agent is also a health care agent or surrogate." Id. at A-5.
24. Id at A-15 (§ 20-510 of the draft legislation).
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nature more than a minor increase over minimal risk, investigators
will have a very strong incentive to circumvent legal restrictions by
taking the stance that all patients involved in these studies are fully
capable of giving informed consent.
Similarly, under the draft legislation, the interpretation of research involving PET scans may involve more than a "minor increase
over minimal risk." PET scans, described simplistically, involve taking
a "picture" of activity in the brain with the use of injected radioactive
substances."5 PET'scans are common tools of neurological and psychiatric research and are typically employed in studies that are not
therapeutic and pose no direct medical benefits to the subjects.2 6
Does a PET scan count for more than a minor increase over minimal
risk? Out of a few thousand PET scans performed at NIH, complications have occurred in a few patients connected with arterial lines
used in the scanning procedure-complications that have required surgery to correct. Thus, although the risk is slight, it would seem that a
"reasonable possibility" exists of "severe or prolonged pain or discomfort" or "deterioration in a medical condition" resulting from a PET
scan.27 Furthermore, the use of radiation might be considered to
make these studies more than minimal risk. Although there is no documented evidence of harm caused by exposure to the amount of radiation produced by PET scans, it is possible that low doses of radiation
can cause serious harm. Given the theoretical risk, differences of
opinion are likely concerning whether the use of radiation in these
studies expose the subjects .to the "reasonable possibility" of a "deterioration in a medical condition."2 8 It would be quite unfortunate if
the powerful research tool of PET scans were interpreted as posing
more than a "minor increase over minimal risk." Unless the language
of section 20-504(d) (4) of the draft legislation is changed, research
using PET scans is arguably vulnerable to being placed in the most
restrictive class of research.
These reflections lead to the more philosophical question of
whether it is a. good idea to specify in law what counts as greater than
minimal risk research. A consideration in favor of such specification
is the fact that the concept of minimal risk is otherwise vague and
elastic. It can be stretched to fit diverse research procedures, provided that investigators and IRB members think the research is justified. Yet the potential problems posed by applying the Research
25. MARVN LcEv &
26. Id.

BARBARA GORDON, MEDICINE AND MENTrAL ILLNESS

71-72 (1991).

27. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-7 (§ 20-504(d)(4) of the draft legislation).
28. Id.
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Working Group's effort to specify criteria for research that is more
than minimal risk raise doubts about the wisdom of such specificity in
these regulations. The federal regulations, following the recommendations of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, define "minimal risk" but do not stipulate criteria for research
that is greater than minimal risk.29 Judgments about this are left to
the discretion of IRBs.3 0 A compromise position is to translate the
rules stipulating conditions that make research more than minimal
risk into guidelines,specifying criteria for risk assessment, to be used by

IRBs in determining when research poses greater than minimal risk.
Two corrective changes are suggested. First, clear language should
replace the ambiguous term "reasonable possibility." Second, the Research Working Group should consider qualifying the phrase "deterioration in a medical condition" by indicating that the deterioration
exceeds some threshold level of minimal severity and by introducing a
time factor, for example, a deterioration that is more than transient.
C.

The Scope of Expected Benefit Research

Turning to section 20-507 (a) (1), "expected benefit research," it is
misleading to describe this research as pertaining to "the class of decisionally incapacitated individuals who have been authorized by an IRB
to be enrolled in research." 3 ' The presumption is that "class" refers to
refer to the specific group of subjects to be enrolled in a research
protocol. But the term "class" might be -interpreted much more
broadly to include all those persons subject to the disorder under
study. Whereas non-therapeutic studies, by definition, have no expected benefit for the subjects of the study, they may in the future
lead to benefit for the "class" of patients with a particular disorder.
The latter interpretation of "class" would allow research normally having "no expected benefit" to be construed as "Expected benefit research." It is therefore important to make perfectly clear that the
prospect of direct medical benefit pertains only to the subjects of a
specific protocol.

29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i). The regulations define minimal risk as "the probability and
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." Id

30.

ROBERTJ. LEVINE, ETHics AND REGULATION OF CUNICAL RESEARCH

31. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-10.

248 (1986).
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D. Research with Individuals Who Have Never Had Decisional Capacity
Another potential problem with the draft legislation is that it may
be interpreted as excluding "no expected benefit research" for subjects who have never had decisional capacity. The stipulations for all
three categories of "no expected benefit research" seem to require
that the research agent, health care agent, surrogate, or monitor determine that the subject without decisional capacity would consent to
participate in research if able to give informed consent.3 2 Is it possible to make such a determination in the case of someone who has
never had decisional capacity - for example, an individual with
profound mental retardation? It is suspected that it may often, if not
always, be a fiction to make a judgment that an individual who never
had capacity would consent to participation in research if capacitated.
For on what basis would the judgment be made? Is it the intent of the
Research Working Group to rule out all "no expected benefit research" for subjects who never had decisional capacity? Would this be
desirable?
Explicit attention to research with subjects who have never had
decisional capacity seems warranted. Greater restrictions on research
with these subjects may be justified, since they lack the ability to specify in an advance directive or express verbally their preferences concerning participation in research. Perhaps such subjects should be
enrolled in no expected benefit research only if it poses no more than
minimal risk.3 3
E. Loss of Decisional Capacity During Research
Finally, the law as currently drafted does not seem to provide any
clear provision for the case of a subject who gives informed consent to
enter research but becomes incapacitated during the course of a
study. It would be desirable to have a section explicitly devoted to
32. lId at A-12 (§ 20-508 of the draft legislation).
33. A more recent draft reflects this concern. The proposed statute states in pertinent
part: "No legally authorized representative other than a research agent or health care
agent may consent to a decisionally incapacitated individual's participation in [no expected benefit, minor increase over minimal risk) research." Jack Schwartz, Office of the
Md. Att'y Gen., Third Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group (August
1, 1997) [hereinafter Third Report] (the Third Report is reprinted in the appendix to this
issue of the Journal of Health CareLaw & Policy). Moreover, for research which is no direct
benefit and more than a minor increase over minimal risk, the draft permits only research
agents to consent, and only when, among other requirements, a monitor confirms that
"the research is unambiguously included in the individual's advance directive authorizing
research participation." I. at A-22 (§§ 20-516(b)(1)(I)(d) of the draft legislation; reprinted in Appendix A to the Third Report).
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substitute decision-making by a "legally authorized representative" in
this situation. Furthermore, for certain types of research, it is predictable that some of the subjects will lose capacity during the course of
the research. For these studies, the IRB should require that the subjects designate in advance a research agent to make decisions concerning continued participation of the subject in case of decisional
incapacity.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I recommend five changes for the proposed Maryland
legislation governing research with decisionally incapacitated patients.
One, the definitions should explain the role of the monitor and what
is meant by a surrogate, as distinct from a health care agent. In addition, a more fitting label than "monitor" should be adopted. 4 Two,
the sections stipulating what counts as more than minimal risk should
be transformed into guidelines for IRBs to assess the risk level of prospective studies."5 Furthermore, examples of loss of dignity should be
indicated,3 6 "reasonable possibility" should be replaced by a clearer
term, 3 7 and "deterioration in a medical condition" should be qualified
both with respect to degree and duration." Third, the misleading
term "class" should be omitted from the provision stipulating the
scope of "expected benefit research."" Fourth, guidelines for research with subjects who have never had decisional capacity should be
included, and finally, the law should address substitute decision making for patients who lose decisional capacity in the course of research.

34. Second Report, supra note 1, at A-4 (§ 200502(o) definition of "monitor" in the
draft legislation); accord id. at A-5 (§ 20-502(s) definition of "surrogate"); id. at A-2 (§20502(f) definition of "health care agent").
35. Id. at A-5 (§ 20-504 of the draft legislation).
36. Id at A-7 (§ 20-504(d) (3) of the draft legislation).
37. Id. (§ 20-504(d) (4) of the draft legislation).
38. Id. (§ 20-504(d) (4) (ii) of the draft legislation).
39. Id. at A-10 (§20-507(a)(1) of the draft legislation).

